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A B S T R A C T   
The energy policy of The Visegrad Group states (V4: Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary) is being challenged 
by, among many other factors, dependence on the import of energy resources, increasing environmental pres-
sure, insufficient and disappointing process of energy policy Europeanisation. Therefore, all V4 states are seeking 
new energy policy solutions and directions, which is seen as a condition for both economic and political 
development. This paper provides a conceptualisation of the geopolitical dimensions of energy policy strategy, 
empirically focusing on its Southern direction. Firstly, it aims to identify and analyse the key areas of strategic 
thinking about energy security in the Visegrad states. Secondly, it attempts to answer the question of place and 
importance of the Southern Dimension (SD) in V4 energy policy strategies. In other words, it investigates 
whether the V4 states energy security can be improved by deepening energy cooperation with partners from 
southern regions, in particular with the MENA region. The hypothesis to be verified by this study states that the 
more hawkish V4 states’ energy security strategies are, the greater their preference for the liberalisation of the 
international energy market. The article follows the qualitative approach and relies on the case study 
methodology.   
1. Introduction 
The paper provides an overview of the current place and importance 
of the concept of a comprehensive geopolitical diversification of energy 
strategies in the Visegrad Group (V4) states.1 The conceptualisation of 
the objectives and directions of V4’s energy policy strategies is influ-
enced by a number of internal and external factors. Just to mention a 
few: dependence on energy resources import, efficiency of critical do-
mestic energy infrastructure, growing environmental concerns and 
attitudes towards the process of the Europeanisation of energy policy at 
the EU level.2 Furthermore, after years of growth led by foreign direct 
investments (FDI) and the availability of a cheap but relatively skilled 
labour force, V4 countries face a middle-income trap.3 According to A. 
Nolke and A. Vliegenthart, all of these issues led to the emergence of a 
specific variant of capitalism in the V4 states which the authors called 
‘Dependent Market Economies’ (DME).4 To move beyond their semi- 
periphery economic and political status, they have been attempting to 
pursue more complex and comprehensive, but also more assertive, 
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1 The two-letter abbreviations of states’ names will be used hereafter: Czechia – CZ, Hungary – HU, Slovakia – SK, Poland – PL.  
2 Europeanisation of the energy policy (similarly to other EU public policies) is a process which starts with the construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the 
logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies’ (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004, pp. 3–4). However, it is not limited to 
adaptation and incorporation of formal rules. It also encompasses the transformation and internalisation of political visions, which are then translated into legally 
binding decisions and strategic initiatives. It is therefore a multi-stage and multidimensional, processual phenomenon (Dyduch, 2015, p. 213).  
3 It is defined as a sharp deceleration of a country’s economic growth upon reaching a per capita income of around 15,000$ (Agenor and Canuto, 2015, pp. 
642–644).  
4 Authors describe DMEs as economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that “have comparative advantages in the assembly and production of relatively 
complex and durable consumer goods. These comparative advantages are based on institutional complementarities between skilled, but cheap, labor; the transfer of 
technological innovations within transnational enterprises; and the provision of capital via foreign direct investment” (Nolke and Vliegenthart, 2009, p. 672). 
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international policies where national interest is perceived as a core 
element of both political and economic strategies. Yet it is interesting 
that this new conceptual vision of national development strategy is not 
aimed at the creation of a closed economy, isolated from foreign threats. 
Analysis of how public policies’ goals are operationalised suggests the 
liberal character of this vision and preference for the international free 
trade mechanisms. (see Table 1, Figs. 1 and 2) 
V4 states have recently expressed their individual concerns and 
preferences regarding the prospects of national and regional energy 
security more openly. This has been exemplified by active support for 
nuclear energy development (mostly by HU, CZ, SK), criticism of the 
EU’s far-reaching environmental policies (PL, CZ), and export diversi-
fication projects going beyond the EU’s framework of strategic planning. 
Each of the V4 states individually (but also all of them collectively, as the 
Visegrad Group) tries to develop strategies and searches for solutions 
which can improve their national and regional energy security and 
minimise the negative aspects of ‘international interdependence’. 
Thus, regardless of further exploration of Western, Eastern and even 
Northern dimensions of V4 states’ energy strategies, which have been 
already elaborated on in the literature (Deak, 2011; Minarik, 2014; 
Racz, 2014; Tarnawski, 2015; Tichý, 2019), the fourth, Southern 
Dimension (SD) has emerged as an important element of the V4’s stra-
tegic landscape. As the CEO of PGNiG, a major gas company in the 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE),5 has pointed out recently: “We want 
to be the company at the crossroads of North-South and East-West, we 
need something to the South.” (Reuters, 2019). 
Academic literature provides a decent description of market actors’ 
(especially at the local and state level) involvement in the imple-
mentation of national policies, including the energy policy. At the same 
time, the academic debate on the geopolitical dimensions of energy 
security strategies focuses on the primacy of politically-driven consid-
erations (Krane and Medlock, 2018; Tagliapietra, 2017; Sherwood, 
2015; Proninska, 2007). Even if the economic factors shaping inter-state 
rivalry are acknowledged, they are perceived as subordinate to high 
politics. The decision-making processes in foreign policy (including its 
energy aspect) are often presented as centralised, consolidated and 
opposed to the free trade principles in the international dimension. On 
the one hand, we partially agree with this standpoint and recognise the 
primacy of political factors over economic ones (Waltz, 1999). On the 
other hand, we claim that increasing the level of politicisation and 
states’ involvement in formulating economic public policies (e.g. energy 
policy) may result in the strengthening of liberalisation tendencies, 
particularly in terms of international trade cooperation. Developing 
countries pursuing their national interests may choose to support free 
trade rather than protect their internal markets. Although some authors 
(e.g. Isaacs and Molnar, 2017; Krampf, 2018a, 2018b) have already 
started to elaborate on these tendencies, we maintain that current de-
velopments and the evolution of global energy markets may lead to 
decentralisation of the global energy system (particularly its trading 
component). 
The intention of the authors is to provide both theoretical and 
empirical contribution to the academic discourse in this field, high-
lighting how liberalisation of global energy markets matters to less 
developed and less competitive players, represented here by the V4 
states. We will focus on their struggle for geographical diversification of 
external energy policies and international cooperation as a manifesta-
tion of this tendency. The theoretical basis for this study is provided by 
the assumptions of the hawkish6 (nationalist) neoliberalism (Krampf, 
2018b) and its juxtaposition with findings and conclusions from the 
ongoing debate on ‘variants of capitalism’ (e.g. Nolke and Vliegenthart, 
2009; Gertz and Kharas, 2019). 
Thus, the analysis of the SD offered here serves as an empirical arena 
for testing states’ preferences regarding their external energy policy 
strategy. This study is an attempt at identifying and investigating states’ 
preferences for international energy market liberalisation (especially the 
trading system) as an instrument to strengthen their own energy secu-
rity, facilitate domestic energy market transition and thereby improve 
their position in relation to other actors. 
The paper is structured as follows: the first part contains the oper-
ationalisation of key terms and provides a theoretical framework for the 
investigation. The second part contains an empirical analysis of the V4 
countries energy strategies’ Southern Dimension. It is divided into two 
subsections, dealing with diversification and infrastructure, 
respectively. 
2. Methodological framework 
2.1. Theoretical and methodological remarks 
A preliminary, critical analysis of V4 states’ official strategic docu-
ments (SIEA, 2008; MoND HU, 2012; MoE SK, 2014; MoIaT CZ, 2014a; 
2014b; MoE PL, 2018) indicates a growing importance of the ‘national 
interest’. Special attention is given to the struggle with international 
political and economic dependence and its significance for security 
concerns. Therefore, our attention was directed at theoretical concepts 
that elaborate on the phenomenon of a liberal turn among neoconser-
vative, nationalist political elites. One of them, formulated quite 
recently, by A. Krampf, present what it terms as a hawkish (nationalist) 
neoliberalism (2018a; 2018b). The author expounds Israel’s economic 
strategy, where market-oriented public policies are introduced in order 
to promote or pursue national interest. He then explains the evolving 
nature of that state’s economic strategy which is being increasingly 
politicised. Since this particular concept is based, and has been devel-
oped, on the Israeli case study, it needs adjustment and reframing, so as 
to better serve the analysis of the V4 states’ energy policy. Thus, 
‘nationalist neoliberalism’ has been juxtaposed with findings and con-
clusions from the ongoing debate on ‘variants of capitalism’. 
The theoretical concept which can be constructed upon Krampf’s 
observations should address the links between the neoliberal approach 
to governance in the area of states’ public policies (e.g. foreign, eco-
nomic and energy policy) with the hawkish national security position. 
Furthermore, it should explain a purposeful use of market-oriented 
practices as a tool to advance one’s own position in the course of in-
ternational rivalry, both economic and political. This in turn makes us 
take into consideration the influence of geopolitical circumstances on 
states’ strategy regarding the international interdependence, which re-
fers to the nature of contemporary international relations and can be 
investigated by studying international trade, capital flows and mobility 
of labour. Some scholars believed that international interdependence 
can promote peaceful coexistence (Keohane and Nye, 1977) and enable 
Table 1 
Import dependence of natural gas (2017).  
Country Czechia Hungary Poland Slovakia 
Dependence percentagea 102% 96% 78% 106% 
Source: European Commission (2019b). 
a The numbers present import rate as a share of natural gas consumption so it 
can rise above 100%. 
5 The term is used in the paper in its most narrow sense – as a region con-
sisting only V4 countries. 
6 The definition of the term ‘hawkish’ applied in this paper moves beyond its 
traditional understanding of being ‘militant’, ‘warlike’, ‘unpeaceful’. It reflects 
security-oriented positions on public affairs, with emphasis on national security 
objectives to be pursued in a highly competitive international environment. A 
hawkish approach prioritises national security over socio-economic issues. 
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faster institutionalisation of multilateralism. This may be true during 
periods of prosperity, but in times of crises and shrinking resources, 
interdependence can be a source of threat or even ‘economic political 
extortion’ perpetrated by one state on another. Moreover, as Waltz 
noted: “because governments have become more active in economic 
affairs at home and abroad interdependence has become less of an 
autonomous force in international politics” (1999, p. 698). In other 
words, states may want to utilise other actors’ dependence to pursue 
their own political interest. Thus ‘dependence’, understood as a varia-
tion of ‘interdependence’, may seriously limit states’ multidimensional 
development. International pressure imposed by one actor on others 
may become a serious threat to national sovereignty and can lead to 
adopting a more radical form of neoliberal economics. This causality has 
been observed not only in Israel but also in CEE, at least in the cases of 
some public policies – e.g. energy policies (see for example Binhack and 
Tichy, 2012). The liberal turn among several countries has mainly been 
a reaction to the economic and political crisis of the EU, but Russian 
neo-imperial policy (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007) has also facilitated it. 
Consequently, the primary goal of hawkish governments is to deal with 
the challenge of unfavourable international dependence (economic and 
political). 
The application of the hawkish neoliberalism concept to the analysis 
of the V4 states’ energy strategies highlights the need to identify main 
areas of strategic thinking as well as key mechanisms of responding to 
national security threats and overcoming obstacles to national devel-
opment. The literature cites several of these areas and mechanisms: 
diversification of foreign and economic policy directions, preference for 
goal-oriented, pragmatic international cooperation rather than estab-
lishing value-oriented international multilateral-alliances, introducing 
legal and institutional measures that support the development of a 
sturdy and competitive market and entrepreneurship ecosystem, along 
with strengthening the ability to influence market players and, finally, 
investment in strategic infrastructure and technological innovation to 
advance one’s own international competitiveness (Krampf, 2018a; 
2019b). Strengthening of the domestic economy, followed by rein-
forcement of a given state’s international political standing is seen as a 
precondition for enhancing national security and improving national 
welfare. This is manifested in projects aimed at limiting the capabilities 
of external actors to affect national security and the decision-making 
process. Minimising the dependence on others and maximising states’ 
political and economic benefits from international cooperation (possibly 
also interdependence) has become a core conceptual element of stra-
tegic thinking in the V4 countries, at least declaratively. 
The neoliberal trends in the Visegrad states’ preferences regarding 
national energy strategies are to some extent parts of their grand stra-
tegies to transform their economic model of development. This is 
particularly interesting if one acknowledges the relatively limited 
competitive advantages enjoyed by V4 states, especially in the interna-
tional energy market. The V4 model can be characterized by a funda-
mental dependence of domestic economies on foreign ‘inflows’, 
complemented by a limited innovation capacity. However, at least until 
the economic crisis in the EU, the above-mentioned Dependent Market 
Economies variant of capitalism has been pursued by the V4 states 
steadily and fairly successfully (Nolke and Vliegenthart, 2009, p. 693). 
The crisis has become a turning point and catalyst for the transition 
towards a development model (Havlik and Iwasaki, 2017) that reduces 
the level of unfavourable international dependence. Case studies of V4 
states will enable an examination of causal mechanisms and interactions 
between the examined energy security strategies (Bennett and Elman, 
2008). They reveal how energy policies are operationalised. Moreover, 
they will provide enough observable evidence and an explanatory 
leverage to come up with certain general conclusions. The empirical 
analysis utilises the process tracing method which involves an in-depth 
examination of a sequence of events that occur over time. A review of 
the existing literature allowed us to tentatively assume there is a sub-
stantial positive conjunction between the hawkish perception of 
national energy security objectives and attitudes towards the liberali-
sation of the energy market (with particular importance given to the 
international dimension of trade). The process tracing method was 
applied in order to explore actors’ preferences, expectations and stra-
tegies, as well as structural conditions that affect their implementation 
(Beach, 2017). In theory, it allows researchers to trace causal process 
(Brady et al., 2004, p. 12), it describes how the independent variable (in 
this case: the hawkish-nationalist approach) leads to a certain value of 
the dependent variable (preference for market liberalisation). The pri-
mary goal of this research is to verify the hypothesis which states that 
the more hawkish V4 countries’ energy security strategies are, the 
greater their preference for the liberalisation of the international energy 
market. Verification of the research questions via the case study 
approach will be conducted on the basis of two kinds of sources and 
data. First of all, the research has been informed by an extensive analysis 
of secondary sources (literature, expert reports, working papers and 
contemporary media sources etc.) and secondly, institutional documents 
related to the energy policy processes linked to the case studies, with 
special focus of the geopolitical dimension of the strategies. 
2.2. Conceptualisation of the geopolitical dimensions of Visegrad states’ 
energy strategies 
The geopolitical understanding and explanation of states’ strategic 
thinking about energy security and energy policy is nothing new in the 
academic discourse, where attention is given to the geostrategic rela-
tionship between importers and exporters of energy sources (Krane and 
Medlock, 2018), as well as to the international relations’ complexity 
stemming from “broader economic, geopolitical and ideological calcu-
lation” (Proninska, 2007, p. 215). Thus, it should be interpreted in the 
light of the international interdependence phenomenon, where both the 
strategy for the creation of transnational critical energy infrastructure 
and the strategic choices made by alliances and cross-border coopera-
tion bodies on all levels (sub-regional: within V4, regional: EU, 
inter-regional: Europe and its Southern Neighbourhood, and global) 
remain highly relevant. 
The conceptualisation of geopolitical dimensions of states’ energy 
strategy as an analytical category requires defining its geographic and 
thematic scope. Still, an analytical delimitation of the term should be 
rather contractual, or even flexible, so as to allow for the dynamic nature 
of the states’ public policy strategy conceptualisation process. In the 
case of the V4, we define the Southern Dimension as covering the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA).7 This reflects the existing or emerging 
interest in cooperation with the Gulf countries (Qatar, Iran, United Arab 
Emirates, Saudi Arabia) as well as Eastern Mediterranean countries 
(Israel, Egypt). It also highlights the increased cooperation of Cyprus 
and Greece with the Middle East. 
Investigation of the Southern direction in V4 states’ energy policy 
strategies requires a look at the key areas of strategic thinking about 
energy security. The analysis of primary sources (SIEA, 2008; MoND HU, 
2012; MoE SK, 2014; MoIaT CZ, 2014a; 2014b; MoE PL, 2018) helped us 
identify general, strategic goals of the V4 states in the field of energy. 
The first one is diversification, followed by the pursuit of access to 
innovative technologies that would enable and foster energy transition 
in the V4. The second area we have identified is the development of a 
wider regional and inter-regional energy infrastructure. In the next, 
empirical, part of the paper, we will try to assess how significant the SD 
of the V4 states’ energy strategies is for achieving these major goals. 
7 Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, Tunisia, Yemen, UAE. 
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3. Analysis of empirical findings and discussion 
3.1. Diversification 
The diversification strategies of the V4 countries attempt to change 
both the energy mix (increasing the share of nuclear fuel, renewables 
and natural gas) and the group of supplier countries. The energy mixes 
of the respective V4 states are different, but share some important 
characteristics (Fig. 1). 
The common trait of all four countries’ energy mixes (total primary 
energy supply) is a lower share of renewables and biofuels compared to 
the entire European Union, and the EU15in particular. Importantly, 
unlike in the European Union as a whole, in the V4 countries renewables 
and biofuels comprise mainly solid biofuels and renewable waste. This, 
along with the strict environmental policies adopted by the Union, 
makes the Visegrad Group more inclined to search for alternatives to the 
current energy sources and energy-supplying countries. 
Another distinctive trait of the V4 economies is a relatively high level 
of dependence on Russia as a supplier of gas and oil. None of them have 
significant domestic oil reserves. Even though both Poland and Hungary 
have domestic gas reserves and production, these cover only a fraction 
of their present and projected demand. Due to of historical circum-
stances, most of the imported natural gas and oil in V4 comes from one 
source – Russia (Table 1). The V4 countries’ attitudes towards Russian 
import differ, with Poland putting the greatest emphasis on its reduction 
(Kłaczynski, 2018, pp. 9–11). At the same time, the strategies of all four 
member states (MoND HU, 2012; MoE SK, 2014; MoE PL, 2018; MoIaT 
CZ, 2014b) include calls for the diversification of supplies. Once 
interpreted through the lens of the hawkish neoliberalism, such a di-
rection opens up a deeper understanding of motivations behind gov-
ernments’ strategic thinking. 
Diversification, understood as importing energy sources from 
different countries, includes diversifying geopolitical dimensions of V4 
states, which this paper elaborates on. Diversification is treated as a 
priority in CEE, particularly with regard to the gas market, as it is seen as 
being most politicised. As some experts claim (Diallo et al., 2018), 
natural gas will increase its share in the energy mix of V4 countries and 
will function as a bridge towards a decarbonised economy. It is cleaner 
than coal and enables balancing the electrical grid (unlike nuclear and 
renewable sources). The region imports most of its gas from the Russian 
company Gazprom, although the scope of dependence on the Eastern 
partner differs. Czechia buys its gas mainly on the spot market and the 
other V4 member states have long-term contracts with Gazprom. The 
2009 gas crisis was a wake-up call for the region and increased the 
pressure for import diversification. The anxieties were further 
strengthened by the construction and expansion of the Nord Stream 
pipeline. MENA remains the region with one of the highest productions 
of hydrocarbon sources that traditionally provided Europe with rela-
tively cheap energy (because of geographical proximity, among others) 
(Dyduch et al., 2018). Indeed, all V4 members include this region in 
their diversification strategies. 
Official Polish documents, especially political declarations, present 
energy security as inseparable from geographical diversification of the 
sources (Poland imports 78% of its gas demand, primarily from Russia) 
(MoE PL, 2018, p. 4). In 2022, its contract with Gazprom expires and 
Poland has the ambition to entirely, or almost entirely, substitute 
Fig. 1. V4 countries total primary energy supply (2017). 
Source: own compilation based on European Commission (2019b). 
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Russian gas with an alternative source of import. It is the only V4 
country planning to achieve gas independence from Russia in such a 
short period of time. It is a particularly challenging goal, since demand 
for gas is forecasted to grow in the coming years (MoE PL, 2018, p. 10). 
Czech strategy repeatedly underlines a growing rivalry on the global 
energy markets and states that such a trend creates the need for greater 
diversification. It envisages an increase in the natural gas share in the 
energy mix up to 22% by 2045 (MoIaT CZ, 2014a, p. 21). Hungary 
foresees an increase in gas consumption in the following years and then 
its lowering it in the period from 2025 to 2030. At the same time, its 
domestic production will decline, boosting import demand (HU, 2018, 
pp.79–81). Only the Slovak government plans to limit the use of natural 
gas (MoE SK, 2014, p. 19). 
Polish government has three more years to pursue its intention to 
find viable trade partners that can substitute Russia, but it is already 
possible to list some contracts and prospective cooperation with MENA 
countries. Upon opening the LNG terminal in Swinoujscie in 2016, 
Poland began to import LNG. One of the first contractors was the main 
exporter in this sector – Qatar. Currently, the imports are based on a long 
term contract with the world’s premier LNG company, Qatargas. The 
deal foresees that between 2020 and 2034 the company will provide 
Poland with 2.7 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas per year – an 
amount which will cover almost 20% of the domestic demand for that 
resource (PGNiG, 2019). The state-controlled Polish Oil and Gas Com-
pany (PGNiG) has investigated the opportunities for cooperation with 
other Middle Eastern states. For years it has explored and extracted 
small amounts of gas in Pakistan. There were also unsuccessful attempts 
at the extraction of Libyan gas in the Murzuq Basin which were thwarted 
by the security situation in that country. In January 2019 PGNiG signed 
a contract that enables the company to extract hydrocarbons in the 
Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah in the United Arab Emirates. It is politically 
less risky, but geologically more demanding, as the obvious options for 
drilling in this state have been already exhausted (BiznesAlert, 2019a). 
Other V4 states also considered importing gas from MENA, but the 
viability of this endeavour is curbed by the lack of necessary infra-
structure (see below). Czechia aims to continue buying natural gas on 
European spot markets, since it is left without domestic sources of this 
fuel. It is also interested in Caspian gas. Hungarian energy strategy takes 
note of the opportunity to buy gas from non-Russian sources after 
gaining access to the Polish and Croatian LNG terminals as well as 
constructing a gas corridor to Italy. At this moment, though, it is too 
early to judge if the new deals will include resources from MENA (HU, 
2018, pp. 28–29). Slovakia also sees new infrastructural projects as an 
opportunity for increased gas imports from the Middle East (IEA, 2018, 
p. 49). 
New prospects for imports from MENA may arise with the develop-
ment of gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean area. Cyprus, Israel and 
Egypt are planning to increase natural gas production in the near future 
and the reserves in this area are estimated to be 3,45 trillion cubic 
meters (Ruble 2017). Until now, lack of infrastructure, coupled with 
domestic circumstances in Egypt and Israel, have prevented the increase 
in energy exports from this region but this will probably change in the 
coming years. The countries in the region created The Eastern Medi-
terranean Gas Forum to facilitate the development and trade in natural 
gas either via pipelines or by sea (Johnson, 2019). Visegrad states have 
good relations with both Egypt and Israel and in the medium term can 
become beneficiaries of the growing energy production in the East 
Mediterranean. During the Egypt-V4 and Israel-V4 meetings in 2017, the 
parties agreed on strengthening energy cooperation, citing gas as the 
main point of interest (Visegrad Group 2017a, 2017b). The largest 
Polish state gas company openly expressed its interest in importing Is-
raeli gas (BiznesAlert, 2019b). Furthermore, in the light of the future 
increase in interconnectivity of V4’s gas systems, V4 states have recently 
openly supported the liberalisation of the European gas market 
(Cwiek-Karpowicz and Kałan, 2013; CEEP, 2018), as such a move would 
reduce their dependence on Russia and increase the effectiveness of their 
foreign policy toward this state. 
Another hydrocarbon fuel, oil, is much more accessible than natural 
gas. As a result, being dependent on its imports from Russia isn’t pre-
sented in the public debate as a major security threat (as opposed to gas 
dependence). Itis also easier to diversify its supply. In recent years 
Poland has decreased the share of Russian oil in its energy mix. The new 
sources of imports are Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Polish energy strategy 
envisages a rise in the imports by sea (MoE PL, 2018, p. 25) which would 
also enable an increase in the deliveries from MENA. Czechia and 
Hungary have also decreased their dependence on Russian oil (by 13 and 
30 percentage points in the last 10 years, respectively), although Russia 
remained their largest supplier (55% and 67%, respectively). The new 
oil import comes mainly from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, but also from 
MENA. In 2015 Iraq became the third, and in the following years the 
second, biggest exporter of oil to Hungary. Shipments from Libya, albeit 
less significant, have also begun (European Commission, 2019a; Mroc-
zek, 2019). Only Slovakia retained its import structure. It imports 
virtually all of its oil demand via the “Friendship” pipeline, mainly from 
Russia and Azerbaijan. The trade is based on a 15-year supply agreement 
signed in 2014. 
V4 states vocally supported the nuclear deal with Iran in the belief 
that it could facilitate their diversification strategies and substantially 
reduce dependence on Russia. After signing the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA, 2015), negotiations between the V4 and Iran 
were initiated. The V4 saw certain economic benefits in normalising its 
ties with Tehran. Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary, for instance, were 
interested in cooperating on the development of nuclear energy tech-
nology (FARS News Agency, 2017a; 2017b; cf. Dudlak 2018, pp. 
470–473). All three countries have nuclear power reactors (CZ: 6, SK: 4 
 2 under construction, HU: 4) and wish to further increase the share of 
nuclear power in their energy mixes. Meanwhile, Poland began pur-
chasing Iranian oil and crude oil (the first two shipments arrived in 
Gdansk in 2018) (Money.pl, 2018). At that time all V4 governments 
believed that viable ties with Iran would increase their energy security. 
They have also concluded agreements on R&D cooperation and trade 
with Tehran (Jafariyeh, 2018; Visegrad Group 2017c). Ultimately, the 
decision of the USA to withdraw from JCPOA and the pressure put on the 
V4 not to cooperate with Iran effectively froze their energy relations. 
Nonetheless, the future export of hydrocarbon fuels from the Persian 
Gulf via pipelines remains an open question. Before the Syrian civil war, 
Turkey and Qatar negotiated the construction of a new pipeline for 
transfers to Europe. Syria’s territory would be of utmost importance in 
this regard. Political instability has curbed any significant infra-
structural investments for years, but we cannot rule out the return of the 
Syrian state as a partner in the Middle Eastern energy projects in the 
future. Another wildcard is the future role of Tehran. Many European 
countries count on increased imports from Iran (Virag, 2018). The EU is 
working on a special-purpose vehicle (SPV) for trade with Iran that 
would bypass American sanctions, but the prospects for its effectiveness 
are not clear. Regardless, V4 states’ search for new directions of 
importing raw materials and the eager use of subsequent political 
’openings’ are a proof of their determination in the implementation of 
diversification strategy aimed at reducing unfavourable international 
economic and political dependence. 
The Europeanisation of the energy policy and liberalisation of the 
European energy market might facilitate the above-mentioned endeav-
ours. The Third Energy Package (TEP)8 adopted in 2009, along with the 
subsequent plan of an Energy Union presented by the European Com-
mission in 2015 (European Commission 2015, 2019c) and the recent Gas 
Market Directive (European Parliament and the Council, 2019) from 
2019, constitute gradual but substantial steps toward a more integrated 
8 Basic information on the Third Energy Package can be found on the official 
European Commission website: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release 
_MEMO-11-125_en.htm?localeen. 
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European energy market. For V4 governments, they constitute impor-
tant parts of their respective national energy strategies which clearly 
support the pursuit of a greater energy integration within the EU: firstly, 
they entrust the EU with a greater role in securing the energy systems of 
its member states and, secondly, they use further Europeanisation and 
liberalisation of the energy market as a core tenet. In this case, greater 
internationalisation of the energy policy and adopting free-market 
mechanisms might be a tool to pursue national interests. 
Liberalisation of the international energy market, backed by infra-
structural projects connecting European gas systems, would enable 
countries dependent on Russian supply to diversify their energy mixes 
(Gawlikowska-Fyk, 2017; Misík, 2016). Thus, they attempt to protect 
their interests by pursuing more neoliberal policies that liberalise mar-
ket relations rather than the ownership (states remain dominant owners 
of energy sector entities). For instance, Poland considers the liberalisa-
tion of the European market as a method to achieve the status of the 
‘regional gas trade centre’ (MoE PL, 2018, pp. 4–7). CEE states’ pref-
erence for the liberalisation of international energy trade should be 
interpreted also as a part of the ongoing competition between the 
member states (rather than between the market players) within the EU. 
This is particularly true when one looks at the tensions and critical 
disputes among CEE (in particular Poland) and Western (in particular 
Germany) states (Dyduch, 2015, p. 205). 
It must be noted, however, that other V4 states’ stance on energy and 
gas market liberalisation is nuanced. Although V4 members signed a 
joint declaration supporting the Energy Union in December 2015, their 
positions on the issue are far from identical. Broadly speaking, the re-
gion supports the idea, but each government has a different vision of the 
Energy Union’s form and scope. Yet still, current realities related to the 
existing energy infrastructure and the influence of the Russian supplier 
make them focus on more restricted and local projects that secure the 
supply of energy sources in the short and medium term. This can explain 
a lack of strong opposition to Nord Stream from Prague and Budapest 
and the support of the latter for the South Stream concept (Kłaczynski, 
2018, pp. 15–16; Misík, 2016). 
An interesting potential correlation may occur: some efforts to 
reduce the dependence on imports from one supplier may weaken the SD 
of energy strategies (and in fact, all other import directions). One has to 
remember that the strategies of all V4 countries envision improved en-
ergy efficiency and enhanced domestic production (especially from 
renewable sources). They call for constant efforts to develop domestic 
gas fields, both conventional and unconventional (shale gas, methane 
from coal mines). Oil and petroleum products are supposed to be 
partially replaced by alternative fuels (e.g. biofuels). The demand for oil 
and gas might also be decreased by the implementation of electro-
mobility plans which are supported especially by Poland and Hungary. 
All these can be seen as an expression of ambitions to become less 
dependent. However, substantial technological innovations are required 
to implement these plans. 
V4 states struggle with barriers and obstacles to their own economic 
development typical of DMEs. They understand the importance of 
technological innovativeness which is seen as a means to diversify both 
energy production technologies and the energy-mix itself. Therefore, it 
is perceived as a key element of development strategies. This awareness 
is already followed by a number of initiatives aimed at optimising the 
pursuit of strategic goals. While seeking new innovative solutions, V4 
states have often looked southward, particularly towards Israel. The 
already existing and relatively well-established Israeli-Visegrad coop-
eration in this field is being implemented both on the bilateral and 
multilateral level. Indeed, one can point out some important achieve-
ments in this regard, including: the creation of two working groups (one 
focused on innovation and the other on security) (HPofV4, 2017) and 
the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Training Cooper-
ation in the Field of Innovation between the State of Israel and the In-
ternational Visegrad Fund (HPofV4, 2018) which envisions short-term, 
intense training programmes on best practices in the Israeli innovation 
ecosystem for selected entrepreneurs from V4 states. All of the afore-
mentioned undertakings somehow reflect all parties’ intentions, 
expressed during the summit of the V4 and Israel prime ministers in July 
2017 (MFA IL, 2017). It can be said that the Visegrad Group is interested 
in extensive technology transfer, while the Israelis search for recipients 
of comprehensive technological solutions. Nevertheless, considering the 
current stage of innovative sectors’ development in the V4 and Israel, 
the parties seem to have complementary needs and expectations and 
therefore seem to fit each other as partners. 
In the past few years, Visegrad states’ quest for innovativeness has 
resulted in an increasing number of initiatives and arrangements 
implemented with Israeli partners. Just to mention two examples: the bi- 
national grant programmes offered jointly by V4 states and Israeli au-
thorities to private sector industrial or R&D entities, and the Israeli – V4 
partnership on technological accelerators. The Czech and Polish coop-
eration with Israel’s Technion within the framework of international 
innovation accelerators might be particularly relevant. Two interesting 
and pioneering endeavours in this regard are worth mentioning: a Polish 
coal-mining company (JSW- Innowacje) joined the Technion Drive 
Accelerator programme (JSW, 2018) and the Czech-Israeli Partnership 
Accelerator was initiated in 2019 (EEB-CZ, 2019). In both cases, a great 
emphasis is put on environmental considerations the energy industry 
currently faces. 
Israeli-V4 R&D cooperation projects are designed as relatively 
limited initiatives (in terms of participants’ number and budget) (SKILL, 
2019; NRDIO, 2019). Nonetheless, they occur across the V4 with a 
certain regularity and display a progressive trend of searching and 
establishing R&D cooperation, in addition to what is offered at the EU 
level. This specific diversification attempt should be seen in the broader 
perspective of European economic and political interdependence and 
competition among the EU member states. 
Process tracing method used to analyse V4 countries’ energy stra-
tegies and behaviour in the international area unveiled a casual mech-
anism that links a stronger focus on national interest in the foreign 
policy with advocating economic liberalisation of the international 
markets. Both diversification policies and endeavours to develop inno-
vation cooperation with Israel suggest that V4 countries’ attempt to 
reach out to their foreign partners is rooted in the national strategies 
prioritizing security over the mere socio-economic issues. 
3.2. Infrastructure 
The key element of the diversification strategy is the development of 
infrastructure, the backbone of the national and regional energy security 
system. Most of the present infrastructure in V4 countries was built 
during the Cold War. Its main purpose was to secure supplies from the 
USSR and provide it with a transit corridor to Western Europe. History 
has continued to be the main factor shaping the region’s current energy 
policies, perpetuating economic and political dependence on Russia. The 
infrastructural framework serves to maintain the existing structure of 
geopolitical dimensions in energy strategies. Any attempt to diversify 
energy source supplies requires robust investments in this field. The V4 
governments have long struggled to reshape this framework and adapt it 
to the new political and economic reality. Making the SD of energy 
strategies more prominent and imports from MENA states more viable is 
also at stake. 
The most significant gas project in this regard is the so-called North- 
South Corridor (NSC) (Slobodian, 2016, p. 18–19; Usiak, 2018, p. 46). 
Its two major dimensions are: 1. integrating the gas systems of the CEE 
and 2. enabling LNG imports through the terminals of the Baltic and 
Adriatic seas. It could be the way for the region to gain access to the 
global gas market and be able to import natural gas from MENA (Sz}oke, 
2018, p. 60). 
The greatest emphasis on rerouting the gas flows in the V4 can be 
observed in Poland’s policy. It is aimed not only at diversifying fuel 
imports to Poland but also at providing alternative sources for other 
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states in the region (MoE PL, 2018, pp. 21–24). The natural gas trans-
mission system operator in Poland – Gaz-System – intends to intercon-
nect the gas systems in the region and use access to the Baltic Sea as a 
gateway for pumping the fuel to neighbouring states (the Northern Gate 
concept). It has already finalised a few projects, such as expanding gas 
connections with Germany (Lasow, Malinow), Czechia (Cieszyn) and 
building the Swinoujscie LNG terminal. The plan proposed by Gaz--
System (2019) lists future investments: interconnectors with Slovakia 
and Lithuania, a Czechia-Poland gas pipeline, increasing the Swinoujscie 
LNG terminal’s capacity to 7.5 bln m3/year and developing the Polish 
domestic gas pipeline network so as to pump more gas from the North to 
the Western, Eastern and Southern border of Poland. Another project 
envisaged in Gaz-System’s plans, which would enable more imports 
from MENA, is introducing a Floating Storage Regasification Unit 
(FSRU) in the Bay of Gdansk. According to recent plans, it might start 
operating in the years 2024–29, but the feasibility of this project is still 
contested. 
The southern “gateway” of the NSC is to take the form of a FSRU 
situated on the Croatian island of Krk. Disputes between Hungary and 
Croatia, as well as doubts over economic feasibility, have delayed work 
on this project (Sz}oke, 2018, p. 60), but according to the latest 
announcement of the Croatian government (from January 2019) it 
should be completed in 2021. Its capacity is planned to be over 2.5 bcm 
of gas per year. The main foreign market for this LNG will be Hungary, 
but it may also supply the Czech and Slovakian economies (LNG Croatia, 
2017). 
The three inland V4 states concentrate their infrastructural efforts on 
increasing interconnectivity between their gas systems (and expanding 
storage capability) which would also give them access to MENA energy 
sources. Hungary has invested in new interconnectors to their neigh-
bours. It extended the capacity of the HAG pipeline to Austria in 2016 
and constructed a two-way pipeline to Slovakia. Currently, there are two 
priority infrastructural projects. The first is upgrading the capacity of 
interconnection with Romania which would open access to this coun-
try’s domestic reserves and future imports from the Black Sea. The 
second is increasing gas import capabilities from Croatia, which is 
necessary for the viability of the Krk terminal project. It may be achieved 
by direct pipeline or transit through Slovenian territory, the latter being 
the shortest route to connect with the planned terminal on Krk (Diallo 
et al., 2018, p. 66; Tarnawski, 2015, pp. 136–137). Another project, 
Eastring, is implemented jointly by Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and 
Bulgaria. The planned pipeline would connect Southern Europe with V4 
gas systems. In the future it might supply them with Caspian and Middle 
Eastern natural gas. Eastring is supposed to ultimately have a capacity of 
up to 40 bcm per year (IEA, 2018, p. 49), but the first commercial 
transfers are planned for 2025. Slovakia operates interconnectors with 
Czechia, Hungary and Ukraine and currently supports (in addition to the 
Eastring project) building up the capacity to import gas from Poland. Its 
strategy also puts emphasis on the integration of the CEE markets and 
NSC project (IEA, 2018, pp. 46–47; MoE SK, 2014). The Czech Republic 
bases the security of its gas energy on connections with the German 
system, primarily through the OPAL pipeline (Slobodian, 2016, p. 17, 
23–24), but also strives for increasing connectivity with other neigh-
bours. It is building the STORK II interconnector with Poland and the 
BACI interconnector with Austria (Diallo et al., 2018, p. 40). 
Russia’s position on the V4 countries’ oil market is even stronger 
than on the gas market, but as previously mentioned, it is less politicised. 
Poland has plans for diversifying oil imports, although ending Moscow’s 
domination in this regard is not possible in the short term. The two main 
projects aimed at diversifying oil imports envision the increase of the 
Gdansk oil terminal’s storage capacity (2020) and the construction of 
the second line of the Pomerania Oil Pipeline (2025) which transports 
crude oil from Gdansk to the refinery in Płock (MoE PL, 2018, pp. 
25–26). 
Almost all of Czechia’s oil demand is satisfied by imports which 
mostly come from Russia. At the same time, the country has the 
capability to import oil from MENA by the IKL pipeline which connects 
Czechia with the Transalpine (TAL) pipeline leading to the Trieste oil 
terminal in Italy. Prague’s strategic priority is to retain two functional 
routes for the transportation of oil (eastern and western). In order to 
increase the capacity of the western route, it plans to boost the capacity 
of the TAL oil pipeline and the connection to the NATO Central Euro-
pean Pipeline System (MoIaT CZ, 2014b, pp. 54–55). 
Although Slovakia treats Russia as a primary source of cheap, 
reasonable quality oil, its strategy also prioritises diversification. 
Currently, the country has the possibility to broaden the range of its oil 
sources via connection to the Adria pipeline (which links the Croatian 
port of Omisalj with a Hungarian refinery). It gives access to imports 
from MENA, but Bratislava is aware of the fact that the shipping tariffs 
on Croatian territory are approximately 2–3 times higher than the EU 
standard levels. The strategy aims at developing import capacity by 
building an interconnector with Austria. The construction of the Bra-
tislava – Schwechat (BSP) pipeline would allow the Slovnaft refinery to 
be supplied with reverse flow oil from the TAL pipeline and the oil 
terminal in Trieste (IEA, 2018, pp. 32–33; MoE SK, 2014, pp. 23–24). 
While the development of the BSP pipeline is part of Slovakia’s energy 
strategy, it has been a protracted process. These two routes are supposed 
to protect Slovakia from geopolitically driven disruptions of supply from 
Russia. The Adria pipeline has already enabled imports from Libya, Iraq, 
Syria and Algeria. Middle Eastern, Caspian and North African sources of 
oil are cited as the most important element of diversification. Iran is 
perceived by the Slovakian government as a very important source of 
energy sources, yet a hazardous one due to the international situation. 
To counter the risk, Bratislava’s energy strategy proposes opening trade 
offices in Libya and Kuwait to obtain new import deals (SIEA, 2008, p. 
32). 
Additionally, the infrastructure necessary for increases in MENA 
imports includes the national projects of individual V4 states. Besides 
the aforementioned Gdansk terminal and Pomerania Oil Pipeline in-
vestments, Poland plans to upgrade refineries and give them a greater 
capability to process products of various characteristics (MoE PL, 2018, 
pp. 25–26). Furthermore, all of the V4 countries also plan to develop 
their domestic gas and oil pipeline systems. 
All of the V4 countries’ energy strategies promote, albeit with 
different intensity, the integration of the energy markets in the CEE and 
the liberalisation of international energy markets. Connecting the Cen-
tral European network with the Western one and creating a common 
market would enable V4 economies to use the fuels imported from 
MENA by other EU states (through pipelines and LNG terminals). If this 
goal proves out of reach, regional integration is the second-best option.9 
The key issue in this regard is the North-South Corridor which is sup-
ported by all members of V4. Naturally, Poland is the project’s strongest 
advocate, as it sees itself as a future regional gas hub (connected with the 
gas systems of all neighbours, with increased storage capacities and 
access to international energy markets, including via the Baltic Sea). The 
EU is one of the main vehicles the V4 uses to pursue its goals. We have 
mentioned the issue of European energy market liberalisation through 
the Energy Union framework, but European funding for the infra-
structural investments is also of utmost importance for the CEE (Fig. 2). 
The current European Energy Security Strategy outlined by the Eu-
ropean Commission recommends (2014, pp. 9–10) increasing the 
interconnection of the member states to 15% in 2030, almost double the 
2014 level. Regulation on the Guidelines for trans-European energy 
networks, together with the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), envision 
key projects that should be supported financially by the European 
9 Some experts interpret the push for greater integration in the CEE (like V4 
and, recently, the Three Seas Initiative that comprises of the countries between 
the Adriatic, Black and Baltic seas) as a move to strengthen US and weaken 
German influence in the region and further divide European Union (cf. Rotaru 
2018, pp. 11–12). 
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Union. The majority of the so-called projects of common interest (PCI) 
list, including the above-mentioned interconnectors and the 
North-South gas corridor, comprises initiatives related to Central Europe 
(Diallo et al., 2018, p. 33; European Commission, 2017b). Over 30 
Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E) PCI’s have been finalised 
by Spring 2019). The EU intends to make it 75 by 2022 (European 
Commission, 2019c, p. 14). It seems natural that V4 countries see the 
Union as an important actor that can facilitate the pursuit of their 
strategic goals. 
Another infrastructural project that may contribute to the SD in V4’s 
energy policies is the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), supported through 
CEF and PCIs. It is meant to link the Azeri Shah Deniz gas field with 
Southern Europe via Georgia and Turkey. The European part of the 
project is the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which would run through 
Greece and Albania to reach Southern Italy, via the Adriatic Sea. If 
completed (Italy still has not decided to finalise the project), it would 
deliver 10 bcm of natural gas per year to Southern Europe. As a next 
step, V4 countries could connect their gas systems to the TAP. An inte-
grated European gas system might also be supplied from the growing 
number of LNG terminals. The most significant ones for the Central 
European countries (Swinoujscie, Krk) have already been outlined, but 
many other states (e.g. Italy, Germany, Greece, Romania and Estonia) 
plan or are already building new terminals. The capacity of the EU as a 
whole to import LNG will increase in the future – a fact that will prob-
ably strengthen trade ties with MENA producers. The EU is also backing 
the East-Med pipeline which is supposed to pump Israeli and Cypriot gas 
to Europe (European Commission, 2017a). 
At the same time it should be mentioned that there is also friction 
between EU institutions and the V4 countries regarding energy security. 
The best example is Hungary which has pursued policies contrary to the 
EU guidelines. It cooperated closely with Russia in expanding the nu-
clear reactor near Paks, supported the South Stream pipeline, increased 
state ownership in the energy sector and criticised the possibility of 
European institutions scrutinising energy deals concluded by member 
states (Isaacs and Molnar, 2017). Simultaneously, this stance positioned 
Budapest against the priorities of the Polish government. Another 
infrastructural project which has pitted the interests of the V4 states 
against each other was the BACI interconnector. It was criticised by 
Slovakia which claimed that it would be deprived of its transit country 
status for gas flows between the Czech Republic and Austria (Diallo 
et al., 2018, p. 41). 
Expanding Europe’s infrastructure for importing energy, improving 
the interconnection within the V4, as well as between the Visegrad states 
and Western Europe are prerequisites for greater liberalisation of energy 
markets and replacing Russia as a dominant exporter. CEE governments 
have recognized this situation and intensified their infrastructural in-
vestments in order to decrease energy dependence. At the same time, V4 
countries’ perceptions of priorities for the region are in many cases still 
divergent (Osicka et al., 2018, pp. 194–195). In this way, international 
energy market liberalisation should be interpreted as a result of the more 
hawkish pursuit for the national security interests. Where the security 
interests of Visegrad Group members diverge, their liberalisation ten-
dency is weakened. 
4. Conclusions and policy implications 
In recent years, all of the V4 countries have taken significant steps to 
alter their geopolitical position – strengthen their security and engage 
more actively in Western alliances. Efforts to reduce their dependence 
on Russian energy resources provided an important manifestation of 
these assertive policies. 
The V4 states’ multifarious policy of diversification aims at 
strengthening their ability to influence the international system. Broader 
cooperation with the MENA region (Southern Dimension) – exemplified 
Fig. 2. Completed and ongoing energy projects of common interest supported by the European Union. Based on: European Commission (2019d).  
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by increased oil and gas imports, the prospect of future trade deals, 
involvement in the exploration of hydrocarbon sources and efforts to 
obtain technologies from Israel - is one element of their strategies. 
Currently, the Southern Dimension is not a dominant element of the 
V4 countries’ energy strategies. Resources from MENA constitute a small 
share of their energy mixes and energy imports. At the same time, the SD 
has a noticeable and growing impact on their energy security. Its sig-
nificance stems also from the ephemeral, yet crucial psychological effect 
of knowing, or at least believing, that the SD constitutes a viable alter-
native. The most important bottleneck for advancing the Southern 
Dimension is inadequate infrastructure. Currently, there is no direct 
pipeline connection between major Middle Eastern gas and oil reservoirs 
and Central-Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the capacity of Polish oil and 
gas terminals is limited, whereas three of the V4 members are land-
locked – a fact which necessitates further investment in connecting them 
to terminal countries. Nonetheless, the V4 countries have made a strong 
effort to develop their infrastructure which is the main reason for the 
growing importance of the SD in their strategies. The development of 
infrastructure is continuing, thus by extrapolating the aforementioned 
tendency, we argue that energy cooperation with the MENA region will 
develop. Another factor that may facilitate the trend is the expected 
decline of what Proedrou (2018) called “pipeline politics” – basing en-
ergy trade on long-term and inflexible deals which are not suited to the 
new situation in the gas market and instability in the interstate relations. 
Pipeline connections to the Middle East remain uncertain as the political 
instability of the region remains the major obstacle to broader cooper-
ation. Furthermore, even if pursued, these investments would not be 
finalised over the next decade. V4 states plan to utilise new options, such 
as the LNG, FLNG and CNG as a substitute for pipeline contracts. LNG 
terminals in Swinoujscie and Krk are the best examples of such an 
approach. 
The developments in the energy strategy of the V4 countries support 
the thesis that they favour energy market liberalisation in order to 
strengthen their own energy security. Case study methodology, followed 
by process-tracing research has probed the theoretical causal mecha-
nisms, framed in this study by the concept of a hawkish nationalist 
orientation in energy strategy, linking causes (perception of interna-
tional interdependence) and outcomes (preference of energy market 
liberalisation). Monopolies distort market forces, allowing dominant 
actors to exploit their advantage over others. In this situation, the lib-
eralisation of the energy markets in Europe strengthens the situation of 
the V4 countries by decreasing their dependence on one (or a very 
limited number of) suppliers. In this fashion, national interest defined in 
hawkish nationalist terms – being independent from other states – pulls 
them towards liberalisation. The main factor at play here is not eco-
nomic, as Russian energy sources are relatively cheap and do not require 
significant infrastructural investments to be delivered. The underlying 
reason for the liberalisation drive is political at its core which confirms 
‘hawkish neoliberalism’ assumptions, utilised in this paper. The most 
significant international energy market players are still states (or state- 
controlled players, like state-owned or co-owned companies) and their 
main aim is to serve the national interest. 
The European Union’s energy policy goals overlap to a great extent 
with the diversification and liberalisation objectives of the V4 countries 
(which is partly a result of their activity within the European in-
stitutions). Continuing in the neorealist perspective, common interest is 
the strongest predictor of cooperation and this can also be discerned in 
the examined case study. The EU provides funding for infrastructure, 
political support for the diversification efforts of member states and 
legal framework for unifying and liberalising their energy markets, 
which is considered a useful instrument of energy policy that can 
advance the national interests of V4 countries. At the same time, one can 
observe that this approach is not based on the general support for the 
supranationalisation of the European system of governance, which re-
quires further transfers of competences from EU member states to the 
supranational EU institutions. Recent years have also brought 
considerable tensions between CEE countries (especially Poland and 
Hungary) and EU institutions. Paradoxically, both support for the EU’s 
Energy Union and conflicts with EU institutions on other political and 
cultural issues might be an expression of the same tendency to decrease 
political dependence. In the former case, from Russia, and in the latter 
case, from Western European countries. 
The investigation has also found divergences between the V4 coun-
tries’ energy strategies. The diversification projects are important for all 
of them, but the intensity of their efforts toward attaining this goal 
differs, with Poland being at the forefront. Polish policy is also most 
openly and strongly aimed not only at the diversification of energy 
supplies, but also at liberalisation of energy markets (and, consequently, 
reducing cooperation with Russia). This is not the case with the other V4 
governments (vide Hungary’s nuclear deals with the Russian Federation, 
Czechia’s policy of retaining both eastern and western energy routes). 
These varied approaches indicate once more that the deep foundations 
of the V4 countries’ policies are their national interests (partly shared 
and partly divergent). Firstly, Poland has access to the sea and aspires to 
become a hub that guarantees steady supplies to the entire region. 
Secondly, Poland’s demographic and economic potential significantly 
exceeds that of the other V4 countries. Knowing that, Warsaw is more 
inclined towards an autonomous, assertive policy and wishes to act as a 
regional leader – a desire contested by other V4 governments. Thirdly, 
its relations with Moscow are strained, much more so than in the case of 
other V4 states, and this fact is evident in the energy sector. In part, this 
is due to Poland’s ambitions. The rest of the Visegrad Group tries to 
balance its integration with the West and its continued cooperation with 
Russia. In other words, the findings of this research confirm that Polish 
energy policy is driven by the ‘energy prometheism’ concept (Jakobik, 
2018)10, whereby Warsaw’s approach is to assist other countries in their 
efforts to escape the grip of Russia’s energy imperialism. The European 
Energy Union, investment in advanced energy infrastructure and 
development of trade cooperation with a relatively large number of 
trade partners, including those from MENA, are considered effective 
instruments of this economic ‘liberation’. 
V4 countries’ goal of energy supply diversification should be pursued 
continually. It is a manifestation of their increasingly active role in the 
international environment and an attempt to erase the remnants of Cold 
War-era dependence on USSR/Russia. A strategy towards such a goal 
should be diverse and include also the Southern Dimension, although it 
is unlikely to become a dominant policy direction in the near or medium 
term future. To increase its significance, V4 should seek reinforced 
presence in the MENA and support stabilization efforts that would 
enable greater energy cooperation with the volatile region. If the V4 
countries coordinate their policy toward the region, they may be able to 
generate synergy. It seems that the concerted activities within the EU 
may be one of the directions to follow. 
One of the major obstacles to the integration of the energy infra-
structure cited by V4 countries’ political establishment is a lack of clarity 
about the cost-benefits calculation of this project and the stability of 
supply and transit flows (Osicka et al., 2018, pp. 193–194). Concen-
trating on the EU may be a way to address those issues. An organisation 
of the EU’s scope can provide funds for infrastructural investments and 
shared legal-administrative framework that can increase predictability 
of energy cooperation. This could also trigger greater political cooper-
ation between V4 countries in the EU, as long as their leaders are able to 
acknowledge their partners’ interests and find a suitable compromise. 
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